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United States v. Bajakajian: Will a New Standard for
Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to Criminal Forfeitures
Affect Civil Forfeiture Analysis?
Imagine that drugs have been found in your home. You are
tried and acquitted in state court on charges of possession and drug
trafficking. After acquittal, the federal government seizes your home
and brings a civil proceeding to deprive you of your property
permanently. This action is a civil forfeiture. If the government can
show probable cause that your property was used in the sale of drugs,
and you are unable to disprove its contention, then you will lose your
home.1
If you are uncomfortable with this scenario, you are not alone.
Civil forfeiture is currently under scrutiny because of its rapidly
expanding use2 and the limited procedural protection given
1. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994). This statute does, however, allow for an innocent
owner exception, providing that no property shall be forfeited because of an act or
omission that was committed without the owner's knowledge or consent. See id.
§ 881(a)(7).
2. See Robert Lieske, Civil Forfeiture Law: Replacing the Common Law with a
Common Sense Application of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 21
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 265, 267 (1995) (noting that civil forfeitures have become
"increasingly popular in recent years" and arguing that this popularity may be in part a
reaction to "perceived over-expansion of constitutional rights for criminals"); Christopher
Zemp Campbell, Note, Excessive Means: Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil In Rem
Forfeitures Under United States v. Chandler, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2284,2284 (1995) (observing
that "[s]ince 1978, Congress has included forfeiture provisions in more than one hundred
laws"); Michael J. Munn, Note, The Aftermath of Austin v. United States: When Is Civil
Forfeiture an Excessive Fine?, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1255, 1262 ("The rising tide of drug-
related crime in the late 1960s and early 1970s... spawned a renewed and vigorous use of
the ancient law of forfeiture.").
Since the 1970 enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Controlled Substance Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 881), which allows the government to seize "instrumentalities" of drug
trade, there has been an explosion in the use of civil forfeitures. Federal and state
governments have recognized the benefits of using civil forfeiture as a crime-fighting
weapon, especially in the war on drugs, and for raising revenue for local crime fighting
efforts. See Jerome Spencer, Auspices of Austin: Examining Excessiveness of Civil
Forfeitures Under the Eighth Amendment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 163, 164 (1997); Alan
Nicgorski, Comment, The Continuing Saga of Civil Forfeiture, the 'War on Drugs,' and the
Constitution: Determining the Constitutional Excessiveness of Civil Forfeitures, 91 NW. U.
L. REV. 374, 376 (1996); see also Kevin Cole, The Civil-Criminal Distinction: Civilizing
Civil Forfeiture, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISsUES 249, 250-251 (1996) (noting that states have
used forfeitures in environmental crimes, prostitution cases, and, in Colorado, against
property used to facilitate any crime); Jon E. Gordon, Prosecutors Who Seize Too Much
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claimants? In response, various politicians have proposed legislative
changes in an attempt to control such expansion of civil forfeiture, 4
and more recently, courts have stepped in to address limiting civil
forfeiture under the Due Process or Excessive Fines Clauses.' In
1993, proponents of controlling civil forfeiture received some hope
when the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the Excessive Fines
Clause may apply to civil forfeiture.6 The Court, however, expressly
and the Theories They Love: Money Laundering, Facilitation, and Forfeiture, 44 DUKE
L.J. 744, 744 (1995) (explaining that since 1970, the use of civil forfeitures has been
expanded to combat money laundering, drug trafficking, racketeering, and mail and wire
fraud). The inherent tension in local law enforcement agencies benefiting from civil
forfeitures has raised widespread concern about the expanding civil forfeiture system. As
Justice Scalia noted in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), "it makes more sense to
scrutinize government action more closely when the State stands to benefit." Id. at 978 n.9
(plurality opinion).
3. In seeking a civil forfeiture, the government only has to show probable cause that
the property was used for an illegal purpose. See Arthur W. Leach & John G. Malcolm,
Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to the Civil Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 241, 254-55 (1994) (defining probable cause as "reasonable ground for belief of
guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion"); Nicgorski,
supra note 2, at 383 (noting that probable cause is the "lowest burden in any American
courtroom" (internal quotation marks omitted)). In seeking civil forfeiture, the
government thus faces a significantly weaker burden of proof than it does when seeking
criminal forfeiture. See infra note 10 (discussing procedural differences between civil and
criminal forfeiture). Furthermore, some civil forfeitures may not even be handled in a
judicial proceeding, but instead by the enforcing agency if the value of the property is
under $500,000. See Yskamp v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 163 F.3d 767, 771 (3d Cir.
1998) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1994)); see also Leach & Malcolm, supra, at 246 (noting
that except for real property forfeitures, which must be judicially forfeited, most civil
forfeitures are processed in administrative proceedings).
4. See Munn, supra note 2, at 1257 (discussing efforts by Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) to
place restrictions on forfeitures and by Rep. Craig Washington (D-Tex.) to require
criminal conviction as a prerequisite); Nicgorski, supra note 2, at 409-10 (discussing efforts
by Rep. Hyde to strengthen the innocent owner defense and to increase the standard from
"probable cause" to "clear and convincing evidence," and efforts by Rep. John Conyers
(D-Mich.) to require criminal conviction as a prerequisite for civil forfeiture).
5. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 446-49 (1996) (holding that petitioner's
due process rights were not violated by forfeiture of her car even though she was not
aware of its unlawful use); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (holding that
the Excessive Fines Clause may impose limitations on civil forfeitures); Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-80 (1974) (holding that appellee's due
process rights were not violated by immediate seizure of the forfeitable property without a
prior hearing); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "); id. amend. VIII
("[E]xcessive fines [shall not be] imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
6. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 609-10 (holding that forfeitures used as punishment are
subject to the Excessive Fines Clause). The Austin decision had the immediate impact of
dramatically reducing the dollar value of federal seizures. See Nicgorski, supra note 2, at
377 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 465 (1993)).
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refused to provide a standard by which to assess "excessiveness."'7
Thus, the lower courts have had to determine what analytical
framework to use.' Without guidance from the Supreme Court,
inconsistent standards among the lower courts have been inevitable. 9
Therefore, the extent to which the Excessive Fines Clause may
provide relief from civil forfeiture remains untested.
In a landmark decision last term in which the Supreme Court
considered the excessiveness of a criminal forfeiture, the Court may
actually have provided guideposts for assessing civil forfeiture under
the Excessive Fines Clause.10 In United States v. Bajakajian," the
Court determined that full forfeiture of the defendant's currency,
which he failed to report to U.S. customs officials, was an excessive
penalty. 12 The case marked the first time that the Court has used the
Excessive Fines Clause to strike down a fine or forfeiture as
unconstitutional. 3 In so doing, the Court also established a standard
7. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
8. See infra notes 163-210 and accompanying text.
9. See Munn, supra note 2, at 1272-73.
10. Whether a forfeiture is civil or criminal depends on the statute the government
invokes in pursuing the forfeiture. See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 3, at 241. While
both types of forfeiture are sought because of some underlying criminal activity, the
difference lies in whether the statutory scheme provides for a civil forfeiture proceeding, a
criminal forfeiture proceeding, or both. Traditionally, statutes called for civil proceedings
if the forfeiture served a remedial purpose and criminal proceedings if the forfeiture was
punitive. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2034-36, 2039-41. But see id. at 2035 n.6 (noting that
modem civil forfeiture also may serve a punitive purpose). Today, depending on the
jurisdiction and the underlying crime, there may be a single statute providing for either or
both types of forfeiture, or there may be separate civil and criminal statutes, in which case
the government may choose which it wishes to seek. Additionally, criminal forfeitures are
"in personam"-they are included in the indictment and result only if the defendant is
convicted of the underlying offense. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994); Leach & Malcolm,
supra note 3, at 264-65. Civil forfeiture proceedings, on the other hand, are "in rem" and
thus brought against the property itself, irrespective of the property owner's involvement
in the criminal activity. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1994); Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2034-35.
When given the choice, prosecutors often prefer civil forfeiture for the procedural
advantages that it offers. See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 3, at 242. For example, in a
criminal forfeiture proceeding, the defendant's guilt and the forfeitability of the property
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See icL at 264-65. The government enjoys a
distinct advantage in seeking civil forfeiture, however, when it need only show probable
cause that the property was used for an illegal purpose. See id. at 254-55; Nicgorski, supra
note 2, at 383. Furthermore, civil forfeiture proceedings are usually brought after criminal
prosecution, enabling the government to take advantage of the benefits of collateral
estoppel if the defendant is convicted. See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 3, at 242, 259. If
the claimant is not convicted, civil forfeiture can still be sought without violating the
Double Jeopardy Clause, and the defendant may not claim collateral estoppel because of
the higher burden of proof for criminal conviction. See id. at 258-59.
11. 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998).
12- See id. at 2031.
13. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2041. The Supreme Court has only considered
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for ascertaining whether a "punitive forfeiture is constitutionally
excessive."' Although Bajakajian involved a criminal forfeiture, the
holding, as well as the Court's extensive discussion distinguishing
criminal and civil forfeiture, may have opened the door for courts to
apply this new test in their treatment of civil forfeiture.
This Note first discusses the facts of the Bajakajian case, as well
as the majority and dissenting opinions.15 Next, the Note traces the
historical development of civil forfeiture, emphasizing its changing
justifications.'6 It then discusses the various tests that the circuit
courts have applied in assessing "excessiveness,' 7 and follows with
an examination of how the Court's treatment of a criminal forfeiture
in Bajakajian could significantly affect the judicial analysis of civil
forfeiture. 8 Finally, the Note questions whether Bajakajian may
actually expand the use of civil forfeiture instead of encouraging
judicial constraint.' 9
In 1994, Hosep Bajakajian, an Armenian raised in Syria, was
traveling with his family from the United States to Cyprus via Italy.
20
He carried with him $357,144 in cash, which he had either earned
from his gas station business or borrowed from friends to repay
relatives in Syria who had helped him start his business in the United
States.21 Federal law, however, prohibits the transporting of more
than $10,000 out of the country without reporting to customs
officials. 2 Prior to boarding the flight to Italy, Bajakajian and his
wife were stopped and questioned by customs officials, who, with the
aid of dogs trained to smell currency, had already found $230,000 in
the couple's checked baggage.23  Despite the customs officials'
warning that the law requires reporting of all money in excess of
$10,000, Bajakajian responded that they each were carrying less than
$10,000.24
application of the Excessive Fines Clause within the last decade. See Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989) (noting that the Court had never
before considered application of the Excessive Fines Clause).
14. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036.
15. See infra notes 20-80 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 85-162 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 163-210 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 211-81 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text.
20. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2032.
21. See Seizure Challenge Regains Cash, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 46,46.
22. See 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (1994).
23. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2032.
24. See id. Bajakajian would later explain that he failed to report the money and lied
to the customs inspectors "because of fear stemming from 'cultural differences.'" Id.
1598 [Vol. 77
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The customs officials searched the couple's wallets and carry-on
bags and seized the undeclared currency1 As a result, Bajakajian
was indicted by a grand jury on three counts, including willful failure
to report,26 false material statement to the U.S. Customs Service,27
and forfeiture of the total amount involved in violating the reporting
requirement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1). 2 Bajakajian pleaded
guilty to the first count of failure to report.29 The Government
dismissed the second count of false material statements, and
Bajakajian requested a bench trial on the forfeiture issue. 0
Under § 982(a)(1), the entire unreported currency amount was
subject to criminal forfeiture because it was "'involved in' " the
offense.31 The district court determined, however, that the money
had been lawfully earned and was being transported to pay a lawful
debt.3 2 The court therefore concluded that forfeiture of the entire
amount would be "'extraordinarily harsh'" and "'grossly
disproportionate to the offense in question,' " thus violating the
Excessive Fines Clause.33 The district court imposed a $5000 fine
under the Sentencing Guidelines, and an additional forfeiture of
$15,000 to reflect the court's determination of the gravity of the
offense.34
On appeal by the government, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals applied a two-prong test in considering the constitutionality
of the forfeiture under the Excessive Fines Clause.35 The test
required that the court first determine whether the forfeited property
Having grown up as a minority in Syria, he distrusted governments. See id. In dissent,
Justice Kennedy accused the majority of taking the cultural misunderstanding into account
in considering the seriousness of Bajakajian's offense. See id. at 2045 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
25. See id. at 2032.
26. The applicable statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (1994), criminalizes the non-
reporting of currency in excess of $10,000 that is transported out of the country. See id.
Section 5322(a) imposes a fine of "not more than $250,000, or [imprisonment] for not
more than five years, or both" for willful non-reporting. Id. § 5322(a) (1994).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
28. See id. § 982(a)(1) (1994) ("The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted
of an offense in violation of section ... 5316,... shall order that the person forfeit to the
United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property
traceable to such property.").
29. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2032.
30. See id.
31. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)).
32. See id.
33. Id. (quoting the district court transcript at 63).
34. See id.
35. See id.
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was an "instrumentality" of the crime, and then evaluate whether the
value of the property was "proportional to the culpability of the
owner." 36 Under the first prong, the court held that the currency was
not an "instrumentality of the crime of failure to report" because the
crime only involved "'the withholding of information, ... not the
possession or the transportation of the money.' ,37 Having
determined that the currency did not meet the instrumentality
threshold, the Ninth Circuit did not proceed to the second prong of
the test. The court held that "[f]orfeiture of currency is
unconstitutional when the crime to which the forfeiture is tied is a
mere failure to report. ' 38 The court claimed to have no jurisdiction
to set aside the $15,000 forfeiture, however, because Bajakajian had
not cross-appealed.39
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the holding of the
Ninth Circuit, which held the forfeiture statute per se
unconstitutional in cases of currency forfeiture, voided part of an act
of Congress.40 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that full
forfeiture in this particular case would violate the Excessive Fines
Clause.4 Because the Court analyzed the forfeiture differently than
the Ninth Circuit and articulated a different standard for assessing
excessiveness, the Court did not address the statute's
constitutionality. 42
36. United States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334, 336 (9th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 118 S. Ct. 2028
(1998). The Ninth Circuit noted that it had recently used this two-prong test in United
States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 1995). See Bajakajian, 84 F.3d
at 336.
37. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d at 337 (alterations in original) (quoting United States V.
$69,292.00 in United States Currency, 62 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 1995)). Judge Wallace
of the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the majority's holding with respect to the first prong
and argued that "without the currency, there can be no offense." Id. at 339 (Wallace, J.,
concurring). However, he agreed with the district court that full forfeiture was
disproportionate. See id. (Wallace, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 337-38. Essentially, the Ninth Circuit declared 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (1994)
to be unconstitutional as it applies to 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1994), which criminalizes the non-
reporting of currency, because a reporting violation could never justify forfeiture of
currency.
39. See id. at 338.
40. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2033.
41. See id. at 2031. Justice Thomas wrote the Court's opinion and was joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined in a dissent written by Justice Kennedy. See id. at
2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
42. The Court held that in the case of a criminal forfeiture, "instrumentality" is
irrelevant. See id. at 2036. Therefore, in contrast to the Ninth Circuit's analysis, a finding
that the currency involved in non-reporting is not an instrumentality of the offense does
not by itself indicate lack of constitutionality.
[Vol. 771600
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The majority began its analysis by considering whether the
Excessive Fines Clause applied to the forfeiture at issue.43
Forfeitures are "'fines' if they constitute punishment for an
offense."'  The Court noted that criminal forfeitures "have
historically been treated as punitive."'45 The Court then held that in
this case the forfeiture was clearly punitive because it was imposed as
an additional sanction after conviction.46  The government had
argued that forfeiture of the currency should be characterized as
"remedial" instead of "punitive" because it compensated the
government for the "loss of information regarding the amount of
currency leaving the country."'47 The Court rejected this argument,
stating that even if the forfeiture served some remedial purpose, it
still would have been subject to the Excessive Fines Clause because it
was partially punitive.'
Having determined that the forfeiture was subject to the
Excessive Fines Clause, the Court formulated the appropriate
standard for determining excessiveness. The government had argued
for a test in which a finding of instrumentality alone would satisfy an
excessiveness inquiry.49  The Court not only rejected the
government's characterization of the currency as an instrumentality5
but also stated that "[i]t is ... irrelevant whether respondent's
currency is an instrumentality; the forfeiture is punitive, and the test
for the excessiveness of a punitive forfeiture involves solely a
proportionality determination."'" In so holding, the Court rejected
both the Ninth Circuit's test and the government's argument. The
43. See id. at 2033.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2035.
46. See id. at 2033-35. The Court indicated that criminal forfeitures are always
punitive and therefore subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. Civil forfeitures, on the
other hand, traditionally were considered "outside the domain of the Excessive Fines
Clause," i at 2035, because the "guilty property" and not the person was being punished,
id. at 2034-35. In order to apply the Excessive Fines Clause to civil forfeitures, the courts
must first determine that the forfeiture serves a punitive purpose. See id. at 2035 n.6.
47. Id. at 2034.
48. See id. at 2034 n.4.
49. The government assumed that if property is found to be an instrumentality of the
crime, then forfeiture is per se constitutional. See id. at 2036. The Ninth Circuit, however,
considered "instrumentality" only as the first prong of its constitutionality analysis and
also required that the forfeiture be proportional to the owner's culpability. See United
States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334,336 (9th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998).
50. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036 n.9 ("The currency in question is not an
instrumentality in any event.... [T]he currency is merely the subject of the crime of
failure to report.").
51. Id. at 2036.
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Court then proceeded to articulate, for the first time, the standard for
determining whether a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive: "We
now hold that a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines
Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's
offense."52
In discussing the rationale for this formulation, the Court noted
that "just how proportional to a criminal offense a fine must be" is
not articulated in the text of the Excessive Fines Clause nor in the
history of the ratification of the Bill of Rights.53 Therefore, in
choosing "gross disproportionality" instead of "strict proportionality"
as the standard, the Court relied on two other considerations: (1)
deference to legislative judgment;54 and (2) the imprecision of a
judicial determination of the gravity of a particular criminal offense.55
The Court stated that the "gross disproportionality" test is
applied by comparing "the amount of the forfeiture to the gravity of
the defendant's offense."56 Determining the gravity of the offense
involves measuring the defendant's culpability57 and the harm
caused.58 In its assessment, the Court first characterized Bajakajian's
crime as "a willful failure to report."5 9 The Court looked to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines6 maximum fine of $5000 for failure to
report as a quantitative measure of the gravity of the offense and
concluded that the penalties indicated only a "minimal level of
culpability."'" The Court then considered the harm caused by non-
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2037.
54. See id. (" 'Reviewing courts ... should grant substantial deference to the broad
authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of
punishments for crimes.' " (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,290 (1983))).
55. See id.
56, Id. at 2038.
57. As noted by the Court during oral argument, however, determining culpability
may raise Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issues, thus creating a potential problem
with the proportionality analysis. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Bajakajian (No. 96-
1487), available in 1997 WL 699804, at *49-*50 (Nov. 4, 1997); see also Munn, supra note 2,
at 1275 (citing United States v. All Assets & Equip. of W. Side Bldg. Corp., 843 F. Supp.
377 (N.D. I1. 1993), in which a federal district court refused to undertake a proportionality
excessiveness review because the claimant had asserted her Fifth Amendment rights).
58. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2038-39.
59. Id. at 2038.
60. See Steven F. Poe, Note, Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: The
Constitutional Mandate of Proportionality in Punishment in the Wake of Austin v. United
States, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237, 259-60 (1994) (recommending the use of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in civil cases because they are designed with proportionality in
mind).
61. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2038 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5E1.2 (1995) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL]).
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reporting and determined that it was minimal since the failure to
report only affected the government's ability to collect information.62
Having determined the culpability and harm to have been minimal,
the Court held that forfeiture of Bajakajian's $357,144 would be
"grossly disproportional" and as such a violation of the Excessive
Fines Clause.63
By comparing this forfeiture to early customs forfeitures enacted
at roughly the same time as ratification of the Eighth Amendment,
the government had argued that full forfeiture is a proportional
punishmentP4  The Court rejected this contention, however,
distinguishing criminal forfeiture under § 982(a)(1), which is designed
to punish, from early civil in rem customs forfeiture, which the Court
claimed served to reimburse the government for losses due to evasion
of customs duties.65
Justice Kennedy, joined by three other Justices,66 authored a
dissenting opinion attacking the logic and precedent used by the
majority in its application of an excessiveness test and the resulting
disruption to the federal forfeiture system.67  Although Justice
Kennedy appeared to agree with the majority's formulation of a gross
disproportionality test, he took issue with the majority's application
of the proportionality analysis.68 He argued that full forfeiture of the
currency would be appropriate because: (1) the amount of the
forfeiture would be inherently proportional to the gravity of the
offense;69 (2) the forfeiture would compensate the Customs Service
for the enforcement expenses;7 and (3) Congress had determined
that full forfeiture appropriately reflects the gravity of the offense.7 1
Justice Kennedy supported his first two arguments by rejecting
62. See id. at 2039. The Court rejected the notion that the forfeiture was "perfectly
calibrated" because the amount unreported-and therefore forfeited-correlated to the
amount of harm the government would have suffered. Id.
63. Id. at 2039,2041.
64. See id. at 2039.
65. See id. at 2040; see also infra notes 93-113 and accompanying text (discussing early
customs forfeitures).
66. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined in the dissent.
See id. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The decision is disturbing both for its specific
holding and for the broader upheaval it foreshadows.").
68. See id. at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("This test would be a proper way to
apply the Clause, if only the majority were faithful in applying it.").
69. See id. at 2041, 2047 (Kennedy, I., dissenting) (arguing that forfeiture of the full
amount sought to be "smuggle[d]" is "calibrated with... accuracy").
70. See id. at 2042 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 2044-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1999] 1603
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the majority's "artificial" distinction between punitive and remedial
forfeitures, which enabled the majority to distinguish Bajakajian's
forfeiture from early customs forfeitures.72  He criticized the
majority's categorical characterization of early forfeitures as
"nonpunitive," and charged the majority with "sweep[ing] all these
precedents aside" in order to reject the inherent proportionality of
full forfeiture demonstrated by the early cases.73
While Justice Kennedy used a comparison to these earlier
forfeiture cases as support for finding proportionality, his argument
emphasized that the majority should have "' "grant[ed] substantial
deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily
possess" '" by giving more weight to the gravity of Bajakajian's
offense.74 Justice Kennedy noted that Congress has expressed the
need to punish non-reporting75 and that the penalties for non-
reporting, which include forfeiture, indicate that Congress has
deemed non-reporting in itself to be a "serious crime. '76 Therefore,
the dissenting Justices considered it irrelevant that Bajakajian's
money had been lawfully obtained and was being transported for
lawful purposes.77
Justice Kennedy warned that the decision may undermine the
protective purpose of the Excessive Fines Clause by causing
legislators to substitute criminal forfeiture with either increased
mandatory prison sentences or civil forfeiture. Owners would
therefore be provided with fewer procedural protections.79  He
inferred from the majority's distinguishing civil forfeiture as
historically "remedial" instead of "punitive" that, as such, civil
forfeiture may not even be subject to the Excessive Fines Clause."
72 Id. at 2041-42. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2042 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2037 (quoting Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277,290 (1983))).
75. See id. at 2044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the need for blanket
punishments for non-reporting to control "drug trade, money laundering, and tax evasion
[which] all depend in part on smuggled and unreported cash").
76. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 2043-44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that if the money
had been unlawfully possessed, it would have been subject to remedial forfeiture;
therefore, its lawfulness should not be considered in assessing the gravity of the offense.
See id. at 2044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent also considered the fact that
Bajakajian repeatedly lied to the customs inspectors as indicative of his culpability. See id.
at 2045 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 2046-47.
79. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the procedural disadvantages
of civil forfeitures, see supra notes 3 & 10 and accompanying text.
80. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2047 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But see id. at 2035 n.6
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The majority in Bajakajian distinguished between civil and
criminal forfeiture both in its discussion of whether the forfeiture at
issue was subject to the Excessive Fines Clause and by distinguishing
the forfeiture at issue from historical customs offense forfeiture."' To
distinguish between civil and criminal forfeiture, and to determine
whether the Excessive Fines Clause affords constitutional protection
to civil forfeiture, it is worth reviewing three areas of the Court's
analysis: (1) the English common law roots of forfeiture;' (2) the
application of civil forfeiture in early American jurisprudence;' and
(3) more recent cases that have demonstrated the tension between
the common law "guilty property" theory and other justifications of
civil forfeiture.84
At the time the Bill of Rights was ratified, three separate sources
of forfeitures existed in English law: deodands," forfeiture of estate
for treason or felony, and statutory forfeiture for customs and
revenue violations.8 6  The deodand derived from the pre-Judeo-
Christian practice that an instrument of death is "accused" property
and, as such, is punishable.' In England, an instrument of death
would be forfeited to the Crown and "was justified as a penalty for
carelessness." '' 8 The second form of forfeiture was rooted in the
(citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993), which clarified the notion that
some modem civil forfeitures are in fact punitive and may be subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause even if labeled civil in rem). Justice Kennedy's concern that the holding of
the majority may render some civil forfeitures above judicial scrutiny has already been
realized in a recent Ninth Circuit case. There the court held that a civil forfeiture that
may otherwise have been deemed punitive was specifically ruled to be remedial-and thus
not subject to the Excessive Fines Clause-by the Bajakajian Court. See United States v.
$273,969.04 U.S. Currency, 164 F.3d 462, 466 (1999) (per curiam) (citing Bajakajian, 118 S.
Ct. at 2041 n.19 (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237
(1972) (per curiam))).
81. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2034-35,2039-41.
82 See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 107-62 and accompanying text.
85. "Deodand" comes from the Latin phrase Deo dandum, which means "a thing to
be given to God." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 436 (6th ed. 1990).
86. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681-83 (1974)
(discussing the three types of forfeitures).
87. See id. at 681 (citing O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 24-25 (Boston,
Little, Brown, & Co. 1881)).
88. Id. (citing 1 SIR MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
419, 423-24 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1847)). The use of the word "penalty" suggests
that deodands also served in part to punish the wrongdoer.
The deodand began as a forfeiture to the Crown to be used for religious and
charitable purposes, but later evolved into simply a source of Crown revenue. See id. The
deodand was eventually abolished in 1846 at the same time that a cause of action was
created for wrongful death. See id. at 681 n.18. Thus, although the deodand originally
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feudal notion that property rights were derived from the Crown and
therefore could be revoked for breach of the King's peace by felony
or treason.8 9 The third type, statutory forfeiture, is considered to
have been a "confluence and merger of the deodand tradition and the
belief that the right to own property could be denied the
wrongdoer."9  Statutory forfeiture, also referred to as civil in rem
forfeiture, was used both in England and the American colonies to
deny property rights in both illegally transported goods and the ship
that transported them.91 This type of forfeiture has continued in this
country and has proliferated during the last several decades. 92
The 1827 case of The Palmyra93 represents the early tradition of
civil in rem forfeiture in the United States.9a In that case, the
Supreme Court held that a ship, which was allegedly used in piracy,
was properly subject to a forfeiture proceeding even though the
offenders had been acquitted of criminal charges.95 The Court
explained that although under "common law"-referring to criminal
proceedings-forfeiture is dependent on conviction of the offender,
"this doctrine never was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created
by statute, in rem." 96  Criminal proceedings and in rem forfeiture
proceedings are independent of each other, with jurisdiction usually
vested in different courts and a lower burden of persuasion applied to
civil proceedings. 97
In The Palmyra, Justice Story articulated the "guilty property"
theory, which has continued to be an underlying basis of civil in rem
forfeiture:98 "The thing is here primarily considered the offender, or
rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether
served to remedy the Crown, it was later replaced with a remedy to the wronged party.
89. See id. at 682; Lieske, supra note 2, at 272; Spencer, supra note 2, at 183. The U.S.
Constitution expressly forbids forfeitures for treason. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3.
90. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
91. See id. at 683.
92 See id; see also supra note 2 (discussing the proliferation of civil forfeitures).
93. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
94. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2034.
95. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 16-17.
96. Id. at 14.
97. See id. at 15.
98. Whether the guilty property theory is in fact the underlying principle of civil
forfeitures was later called into question by Justice Blackmun in United States v. Austin,
509 U.S. 602 (1993), in which he chose to justify historical forfeitures under a negligent
entrustment theory. See id. at 615-18. But see Lieske, supra note 2, at 267 ("Despite their
popularity, civil forfeiture statutes would almost surely be struck down as unconstitutional
were it not for the courts' continued reliance on [ancient judicial precedent] that is no
longer relevant and is unrecognized in any other segment of our society.").
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the offence be malum prohibitum, or malum in se."99 This concept
notably resembles the old English understanding of the deodand, in
which the instrument of the crime and not the responsible person was
punished.100
Following The Palmyra, the Court continued to justify civil
forfeiture under the guilty property theory, but also supplemented its
justification of civil fines and forfeitures with a remedial theory. In
Stockwell v. United States,'10 the statute at issue required a purchaser
or concealer of goods who had not paid customs duties on the items
to pay double their value." 2 The Court also explained that the
government had the right to seize these illegally imported goods the
moment they were imported. 3 Forfeiture of the goods was justified
under a "guilty property" theory, but the Court upheld monetary
fines of an amount in excess of the value of the goods under a
remedial theory.104 The Court considered the statute remedial in
character because "[i]ts purpose was to secure full compensation for
interference with the rights of the United States" 05-rights that the
government had acquired when the goods were illegally imported. 6
Later Supreme Court opinions continued to emphasize the
remedial value of civil forfeitures as expressed in Stockwell, but
noted that forfeiture may also serve a punitive purpose. In a 1972
case, One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,107 the owner of the
property at issue had been arrested and tried for failing to declare the
goods upon entering the United States.0 8 He was acquitted of the
crime, and the Court subsequently considered whether forfeiture of
the goods in addition to a fine equal to their value constituted double
99. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) at 14. Malum in se is an act that is inherently
immoral, without regard to whether the state notices or punishes the act by law. See
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990). Most offenses at common law are malum
in se. See id. Malum prohibitum is an act that is wrong because it is prohibited by positive
law, but is not inherently immoral. See id. at 950.
100. See supra notes 85, 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing forfeiture of
deodands).
101. 80 U.s. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871).
102. See id. at 542 (citing Act of Mar. 3,1823, ch. 58, 3 Stat. 781).
103. See id. at 546.
104. See id. at 551.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 546-47.
107. 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
108. See id. at 232-33. The owner of certain stones was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 545,
which makes illegal the act of knowingly and willingly smuggling certain enumerated
merchandise into the country without complying with customs procedures. See One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 232-33 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1994)).
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jeopardy.1 9 The Court ruled that the forfeiture at issue did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the forfeiture was civil
and remedial in nature."0 The Court explained that" 'Congress may
impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act
or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely
punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for
the same offense.' "
Although it held that the forfeiture in One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones was remedial, the Court noted that some civil forfeiture may
actually serve to punish. 12 The Court noted that a case in which a
punitive civil forfeiture is sought subsequent to criminal sanctions
would raise a double jeopardy issue."u This opinion signaled the
necessity of examining not only the procedural posture of the
forfeiture, but also its purpose.
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.," 4 a lessor
challenged forfeiture of its yacht."5 The vessel had been confiscated
while in the possession of its lessees, who had been arrested for
having marijuana on board."6 Although the owner was neither
involved with nor aware of the unlawful use of the yacht,"7 the Court
upheld the forfeiture."8 After providing a detailed discussion of the
historical precedent of the guilty property theory," 9 the Court further
justified the forfeiture on a negligent entrustment theory.20  It
concluded that the owner had "voluntarily entrusted the lessees with
possession of the yacht, and no allegation ha[d] been made or proof
offered that the company did all that it reasonably could to avoid
having its property put to an unlawful use.'' The Court's reference
to the owner's negligent entrustment as a justification for the
forfeiture raised the question of whether the property of a truly
109. See id. at 234-36.
110. See id. at 235, 237. The Court also justified the forfeiture as liquidated damages in
compensation for expenses incurred in investigation and enforcement. See id. at 237.
111. Id. at 235-36 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)).
112 See id. at 236 n.6. (citing United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S.
715,718 (1971)).
113. See id. at 235-36.
114. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
115. See id. at 668.
116. See id. at 665.
117. See id. at 668.
118. See iL at 690.
119. See id. at 680-86, 690.
120. See i&t at 690.
121. Id. (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). Calero-Toledo
illustrated the procedural disadvantage of civil in rem forfeitures in that the burden of
proof in civil forfeitures is on the party defending against forfeiture. See id.
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innocent owner could constitutionally be forfeited." The Court in
Calero-Toledo noted that such a question could arise in the case of an
owner whose property had been taken from him without privity or
consent or who had taken all reasonable steps to prevent the
unlawful use of his property. 23
The 1996 case of Bennis v. Michigan"a4 offered an opportunity
for the Court to address this issue. In Bennis, a wife suffered
forfeiture of the family car due to her husband's solicitation of a
prostitute.1l 5 Despite the fact that the wife clearly was not a party to
the illegal activity, the Court sustained the forfeiture.26 In rejecting
the wife's innocent owner defense, the Court again applied the guilty
property theory'27 and held that cases authorizing civil forfeiture of
an innocent owner's property are "'too firmly fixed in the punitive
and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.' "1 ,
The Excessive Fines Clause first entered the Court's analysis of
forfeiture in the 1989 case, Browning-Ferris Jndustries of Vermont,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.'29  In Browning-Ferris, the Court
specifically held that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to
122- See id. at 688-89.
123. See id. at 689-90.
124. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
125. See id. at 443.
126. See id. at 453. The majority noted that Michigan law holds a "vehicle owner liable
for a driver's negligent operation of the vehicle by a driver who had the owner's consent to
use it." Id. at 452. The majority thus concluded that the wife could also be held liable for
the husband's illegal use of the car to solicit prostitutes. See id. (citing MICH. COMP.
LAWs ANN. § 257.401 (1990)).
127. See id. ("The Bennis automobile, it is conceded, facilitated and was used in
criminal activity."). Regarding the majority's application of the long-used guilty property
theory, "Justice Thomas recognized that the adherence to precedent was moving the
Court further and further away from common sense... [but] resign[ed] himself to the fact
that 'the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable.'"
See Spencer, supra note 2, at 187 (quoting Bennis, 516 U.S. at 454 (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
128. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 453 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,
254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)). See generally Nicgorski, supra note 2, at 385-87 (discussing cases
in which the owner's innocence was not a defense, including: Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S.
442 (1996); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); J.W.
Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins's Distillery v.
United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877); Brig Malek Adhel v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210
(1844); and The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827)).
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that forfeiture of an innocent owner's property
should violate the Excessive Fines Clause because "even a modest penalty is out of all
proportion to [the owner's] blame worthiness." Bennis, 516 U.S. at 471 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The majority dismissed this argument, however, essentially claiming that the
wife had been negligent in allowing her husband to use the car. See id. at 452.
129. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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punitive damage awards in private suits.13 The Court clarified that
"the Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines
directly imposed by, and payable to, the government."'' The holding
left unanswered whether the Excessive Fines Clause would apply to
civil cases in which the government is a party, such as civil
forfeiture.1 32 The Court did state, however, that "[i]n the absence of
direct evidence of Congress' intended meaning, we think it significant
that at the time of the drafting and ratification of the Amendment,
the word 'fine' was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as
punishment for some offense.' 1 33  Therefore, the Excessive Fines
Clause could be applied to any fine that can be characterized as a
punishment.
In United States v. Halper,'" decided the same year as Browning-
Ferris, the Supreme Court employed the Double Jeopardy Clause to
determine that a civil fine was excessive. 135 The Court held that
because an imposed fine was too large to be rationally characterized
as remedying the government's loss, it actually served as punishment
and therefore constituted double jeopardy. 36 The Court repeated the
point raised in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones that the "labels 'criminal'
and 'civil' are not of paramount importance .... The notion of
punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division
between the civil and criminal law .... "13 In formulating this
concept, Halper and One Lot Cut Emerald Stones laid the
groundwork for the Court to apply the Excessive Fines Clause to
punitive civil forfeiture in its landmark decision in Austin v. United
States.38
Throughout most of U.S. jurisprudential history, civil in rem
forfeiture, as opposed to criminal forfeiture, has been considered
130. See id. at 259-60. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. was ordered to pay $6 million
in punitive damages for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act and for interference with
contractual relations under state tort law. See id. at 259-61.
131. Id. at 268.
132- See id. at 263 ("To decide the instant case.., we need not go so far as to hold that
the Excessive Fines Clause applies just to criminal cases.").
133. Id. at 265.
134. 159 U.S. 435 (1989). Before the government sought forfeiture, Irwin Halper had
been convicted of filing false claims for insurance reimbursement in violation of the
criminal false-claims statute. See id. at 437 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994)).
135. See id at 448-49.
136. See id. at 452. The Court stopped short of declaring that the fine was
unconstitutional. Instead, it remanded the case so that the government could have an
opportunity to show that the district court's findings were erroneous. See id.
137. Id. at 447-48.
138. 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993).
1610 [Vol. 77
1999] CIVIL FORFEITURE 1611
outside of constitutional constraint because the action is brought
against property and not persons.139 In 1993, the Court's unanimous
decision in Austin significantly altered this conception by holding that
if a civil forfeiture serves to punish, it is subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause. 4' The Court noted that neither the text 4' nor the
history of the Clause limits its applicability to criminal cases. 142 More
specifically, the Court noted that a reliance on a "technical
distinction" between in rem and in personam proceedings "would be
misplaced" 43 because " '[t]he fictions of in rem forfeiture were
developed primarily to expand the reach of the courts.' "I'
Therefore, the Court held that forfeitures imposed, even in part, for
the purpose of punishment are subject to the Excessive Fines
Clause. 45
Austin involved forfeiture of a claimant's mobile home and auto
body shop in which small amounts of marijuana and drug
paraphernalia had been found. 46 Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7), property that in any manner is used in the commission of a
drug offense is subject to forfeiture, unless subject to an "innocent
owner" exemption. 47 The Court held that forfeiture under this
statute is "punitive" in nature as evidenced both by the existence of
the innocent owner exemption"4 and Congress's expressed purpose
139. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2035; see also Munn, supra note 2, at 1264 n.68 (citing
pre-Austin precedent holding that owners whose property is forfeited have no
constitutional protection). Prior to Austin, only the Second Circuit had applied the
Excessive Fines Clause to civil in rem forfeitures. See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove
Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text
(discussing the Second Circuit's holding in 38 Whalers Cove Drive).
140. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.
141. See id. at 608. The Court contrasted the text of the Eighth Amendment to
language in other clauses of the Bill of Rights that expressly limits the applicability of the
other clauses in a criminal context. See id. at 608 n.4.
142. See id. at 608-09. There was little discussion of the Eighth Amendment during
debates on the Bill of Rights. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 264-66 (1989) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910)). The
Amendment's language was adopted from the English Bill of Rights. See Austin, 509 U.S.
at 607-09.
143. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615 n.9.
144. Id. (quoting Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87
(1992)).
145. See id. at 610.
146. See id. at 605.
147. See id. at 605 n.1 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C), (a)(7) (1994)).
148. See id. at 619 (noting that the existence of the "innocent owner" exemptions
"demonstrate[s] Congress's intent 'to impose a penalty only upon those who are
significantly involved in a criminal enterprise'" (quoting United States v. United States
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715,721-22 (1971))).
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in enacting the forfeiture statute to compensate for the inadequacy of
traditional criminal sanctions in deterring the drug trade. 49 Despite
determining that Austin was entitled to an Excessive Fines Clause
review of forfeiture of his property, the Court chose not to formulate
a test for determining whether a forfeiture is excessive, since the
lower courts had not had the opportunity to address that question.15
Instead, the case was remanded to the Eighth Circuit. 51
In addition to stating simply that some civil forfeiture could
serve to punish and would therefore be subject to the Excessive Fines
Clause, the majority in Austin added that historically all forfeiture-
and civil forfeiture in particular-had in fact been imposed at least in
part as punishment. 152 Delivering the opinion of the Court in Austin,
Justice Blackmun justified past forfeiture of innocent owners'
property under a negligent entrustment theory and concluded that
"forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular
historically have been understood, at least in part, as punishment. 153
Both Justices Scalia and Kennedy criticized this conclusion in their
concurring opinions, arguing that property historically was forfeited
without regard to the owner's conduct.'5 They claimed that Justice
Blackmun's recharacterization of past civil forfeiture essentially
discounted the Court's earlier reliance on the guilty property
149. See id.
150. See id. at 622-23. The Eighth Circuit had not formulated a test because it had
presumed that the Constitution did not provide any protection against excessive civil
forfeitures. See id. at 606 (citing United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir.
1992), rev'd sub noma. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993)). The Eighth Circuit
had been unwilling to rule against the district court's reasoning that if the Constitution
allows innocent owners to be subject to forfeiture, then there cannot be a proportionality
review. See id. (citing 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d at 817). The court, however, expressed its
hope that the legislature would put a proportionality review into the statute. See 508
Depot St., 964 F.2d at 818.
151. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 623.
152. See id. at 618.
153. Id. at 618. The Court noted: "In none of these cases did the Court apply the
guilty-property fiction to justify forfeiture when the owner had done all that reasonably
could be expected to prevent the unlawful use of his property." Id. at 616 (referring to:
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96
U.S. 395 (1877); Brig Malek Adhel v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827); and Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1808)).
154. See id. at 625-26 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("We have never held that the Constitution requires negligence, or any other degree of
culpability, to support such forfeitures."); id. at 629 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (dismissing the Court's conclusion as an "eagerness to
discover a unified theory of forfeitures" that is not supported by the cases). Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in Justice Kennedy's opinion. See id. at 628
(Kennedy, I., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
1612 [Vol. 77
1999] CIVIL FORFEITURE 1613
theory.'
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia suggested a strict
"instrumentality" test for assessing civil forfeiture under the
Excessive Fines Clause. 5 6 He emphasized the need to adopt-in the
civil in rem context-an analysis that is "different from that
applicable to monetary fines and, perhaps, to in personam
forfeitures," because conviction for the offense is not relevant to the
forfeiture.'57 In so arguing, Justice Scalia remained true to the "guilty
property" theory, which formed the historical basis for civil
forfeiture. Because establishing grounds for a civil forfeiture requires
only that the government show probable cause that the property was
used for an unlawful purpose, he argued that the test should
determine the "relationship of the property to the offense" without
regard to the value of the property.5 8 If the property is not closely
enough related to the offense, then forfeiture is excessive. 5 9 In
referring to historical forfeiture, in which only that part of the
property that was involved in the offense was forfeited, Justice Scalia
155. See id. at 625-26 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id.
at 629 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also supra
note 128 (listing various cases involving forfeitures in spite of the owner's innocence,
which can only be explained under the guilty property theory). One commentator has
noted that since Austin, the "Court appears to have struck a mortal blow to the guilty-
property fiction by finding that essentially all in rem forfeiture actions serve to punish the
property owner." Munn, supra note 2, at 1272.
The Court's statement in Austin that all civil in rem forfeitures have been in part
punitive should lead to the conclusion that all such forfeitures are subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause. Even though the proposition was supported by five Justices, however, it was
only dictum. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 626-27 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the opinion) (noting that it was unnecessary to reach this conclusion to determine that
Austin's forfeiture was punitive).
156. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 627-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("An instrumentality of the offense ... [depends on] whether the confiscated
property has a close enough relationship to the offense."); see also Munn, supra note 2, at
1278 (advocating Justice Scalia's instrumentality test); Nicgorski, supra note 2, at 405
(arguing that proportionality is an inappropriate test). But see Spencer, supra note 2, at
167 (criticizing Justice Scalia's instrumentality test). Historically, the Court has defined
"instrumentality" as property "used substantially to accomplish illegal purposes."
Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1877).
157. Austin, 509 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice Scalia implied that a proportionality test which balances the "value of
the fine in relation to the offense" has already been adopted for monetary fines and in
personam forfeitures. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
158. Id. at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Scalia pointed out that "[s]cales used to measure out unlawful drug sales, for example, are
confiscable whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal." Id at 627 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
159. See id. at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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implied that instrumentality should be narrowly defined. 16 He gave
an example from the old deodand system that if a man was killed by a
moving cart, then both the cart and the horses were forfeited as
deodands, but if the man fell from the wheel of a non-moving cart,
then only the wheel was regarded as the instrument of death and
therefore forfeited. 161 Justice Scalia noted that "juries were careful to
confiscate only the instrument of death and not more."'62
In the wake of Austin, but without a standard for determining
excessiveness, the circuit courts had to develop their own approaches
for assessing constitutionality under the Excessive Fines Clause.
Three such methods emerged: (1) proportionality tests; (2)
instrumentality tests; and (3) mixed methodology tests.1 63
Several circuits have adopted a proportionality test similar to
that used to assess whether a punishment violates the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment."6 In Solem
v. Helm,165 the Supreme Court recognized that a principle of
proportionality of punishment is "deeply rooted and frequently
repeated in common-law jurisprudence," stemming back as far as the
Magna Charta.'66 The Solem Court held that "a criminal sentence
must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been
convicted,"167 and it articulated several objective factors to be used in
assessing the proportionality of the sentence165 The factors included
160. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
161. See id (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
162. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But see
Spencer, supra note 2, at 172 (noting that most courts do not consider forfeiting only the
actual object involved in the offense).
163. See Spencer, supra note 2, at 168.
164. See United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 1994).
165. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
166. Id. at 284. The Court noted that the drafters of the Eighth Amendment adopted
both the language of the English Bill of Rights and the principle of proportionality. See id,
at 285-86.
167. Id. at 290. The Court in Bajakajian borrowed directly from this holding in ruling
that proportionality is the test for criminal forfeitures. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2037.
168. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92. The Court's methodology in Solem was not without
criticism. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor, argued that the holding was at odds with the decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263 (1980), which held that legislatures, and not courts, are better suited to determine
the appropriate sentences for different crimes. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 305, 308 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275). The Chief Justice scorned the majority,
stating that its ability "to say that one offense has less 'gravity' than another is nothing
other than a bald substitution of individual subjective moral values for those of the
legislature." Id. at 314 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Nicgorski, supra note 2, at 390
(arguing that the strong dissent "sent the message that the debate over the existence of a
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comparisons of: (1) the gravity of the offense to the harshness of the
penalty;169 (2) sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and (3) sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.170  The overarching principle of the
assessment is that "[r]eviewing courts ... should grant substantial
deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily
possess.1
171
In Harmelin v. Michigan, 2 the Court reassessed whether the
Eighth Amendment guarantees a proportional punishment. The
divisiveness of the Justices on this issue was reflected in their five
separate opinions. 73  Seven Justices agreed that the Eighth
Amendment guarantees against disproportionate sentences,7 4 but
five Justices questioned the utility of the last two factors of the Solem
test.'75 One commentator has noted that in light of this vote, courts
should apply a modified Solem proportionality test, which simply
involves comparing the gravity of the offense to the harshness of the
penalty.176 Seven years after Harmelin, the Bajakajian Court did just
that. 7
7
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted "strict
proportionality" tests for civil forfeiture, as opposed to the "gross
proportionality requirement in the Eighth Amendment was far from settled").
169. Factors to be considered in measuring the gravity of the offense include the harm
caused or threatened and the culpability of the offender. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
170. See id. at 290-91.
171. Id. at 290.
172. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). The Harmelin plurality held that a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment without consideration of mitigating factors does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. See id. at 994-95 (plurality opinion).
173. See Poe, supra note 60, at 250-52 (discussing the significance of the split of opinion
in Harmelin).
174. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); id. at 1012 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1027-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the Eighth Amendment
does not guarantee proportional punishment, but rather prohibits cruel and unusual
modes of punishment. See id. at 965-66 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter contended that the second two factors of the Solem test should be
used "only in the rare case in which" the first factor leads the Court to infer that
punishment is grossly disproportionate. Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens argued, however,
that the full Solem test should be applied. See id. 1015-16 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall agreed with this portion of Justice White's opinion. See id. at 1027 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
176. See Poe, supra note 60, at 251.
177. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2037-38 (adopting the first factor of the Solem test for
applying the gross disproportionality standard while not mentioning the other two
factors).
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disproportionality" test adopted in Bajakaian . 7  The Eighth Circuit
adopted a proportionality test by reference to Alexander v. United
States179 and held that if a forfeiture is excessive, then there should be
a forfeiture of less than the whole.80 The Eleventh Circuit based its
choice in part on the history of the Excessive Fines Clause' and
what it considered to be the plain meaning of the Clause. 182 Both
circuits have used only the first factor of the Solem test in their
proportionality analyses. 3
In response to Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Austin,t84
other circuits have rejected the strict proportionality review and
opted instead for variations of the "instrumentality" assessment,18 5
which allows forfeiture only if "the confiscated property has a close
178. See United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 1994). Under strict proportionality, a forfeiture is
unconstitutionally excessive if it is not directly proportional to the offense for which the
owner is being punished. See 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d at 1172. The Bajakajian Court,
however, stated that a forfeiture is unconstitutional only "[i]f the amount of the forfeiture
is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense." Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct.
at 2038.
179. 509 U.S. 544 (1993). In Alexander, which was handed down the same day as
Austin, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Excessive Fines Clause may demand a
proportionality test. See id. at 558 n.3 ("Questions of proportionality ... should be dealt
with directly and forthrightly under the Eighth Amendment .... ).
180. See Bieri, 21 F.3d at 824 (remanding the case to the district court for an express
finding of fact to support a proportionality analysis).
181. See 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d at 1171 (" 'A freeman shall not be amerced for a
small fault but after the manner of the fault ... and for a great crime according to the
heinousness of it.' "(emphases added) (quoting the Magna Charta § 20)).
182. The Eleventh Circuit referred to Justice Scalia's rejection of a proportionality test
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in Harmelin because the drafters of the
English Declaration of Rights did not prohibit "excessive punishments." See id.
Therefore, the court concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause, on its face, demands a
proportionality review. See id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991)); see
also Spencer, supra note 2, at 167 (agreeing that these earlier comments by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia are reason for applying a proportionality test in the case of
the Excessive Fines Clause).
183. See 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d at 1172; Bieri, 68 F.3d at 236; see also Spencer,
supra note 2, at 175 (noting that most courts adopting proportionality reject the second
two Solem factors).
184. See United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 623-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); see also supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Scalia's advocacy of a strict instrumentality approach to analyzing civil
forfeitures).
185. See, e.g., United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 1995)
(requiring a "substantial connection" of the property to the offense in addition to
proportionality); United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452, 1462 (7th Cir. 1995) (requiring a
"close relationship to the offense"); United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir.
1994) (applying a three-part instrumentality test).
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enough relationship to the offense." '186 The problem with a strict
instrumentality test is that it leaves open the opportunity for courts to
define instrumentality broadly and thus circumvent a true
excessiveness inquiry.Y For example, in a 1995 Seventh Circuit case,
a man's house was forfeited by virtue of his having received a
telephone call at home regarding a drug transaction.88 The court
applied Justice Scalia's instrumentality test and held that because the
man had given out his home telephone number for purposes of
conducting drug sales, the connection between the property and the
offense was sufficiently close to allow the forfeiture. 9
The majority of circuit courts have adopted mixed methodology
tests, employing both proportionality and instrumentality analyses. 90
These tests may be grouped into three general patterns: (1) a multi-
factor test in which both instrumentality and proportionality factors
are weighed relatively equally; (2) a two-prong
instrumentality/proportionality test, which requires a threshold
finding of instrumentality before a proportionality analysis is
undertaken; and (3) an instrumentality test that automatically allows
forfeiture if the property is an instrumentality of the offense, but
otherwise undertakes a proportionality analysis. Within these
patterns, lower courts undoubtedly have employed many variations
186. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 628 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
187. See Munn, supra note 2, at 1278 ("An instrumentality-based test for excessiveness
will only serve to protect Eighth Amendment rights if courts require a close relationship
between the property and the offense.").
188. See Plescia, 48 F.3d at 1462. In this case, defendant Victor Plescia was identified
by federal officials as the leader of a drug ring. See id. at 1456. Federal agents then tapped
Plescia's home and recorded many conversations he made. See id. In the course of the
investigation, Plescia called co-defendant Norman Demma at his residence and the two
arranged a transaction for the sale of cocaine worth approximately $50,000. See icL at
1456, 1462.
189. See id. at 1462. The Seventh Circuit held that if "property is used in any way to
facilitate any drug-related offense," then the property is forfeitable unless the property
was "'incidental and fortuitous.' " Id. (quoting United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903
F.2d 490,493 (7th Cir. 1990)). The court specifically held that because the defendant gave
his phone number in order to conduct the drug transaction, the connection was not
incidental and fortuitous. See id.
In United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit adopted a
variation of the instrumentality test that would possibly have protected against such a
forfeiture. In addition to looking at "the nexus between the offense and the property and
the extent of the property's role in the offense," the Fourth Circuit also considered "the
possibility of separating offending property that can readily be separated from the
remainder." Id. at 365. Even in Chandler, however, the Fourth Circuit was hesitant to
separate the specific location where the illegal activity had taken place on the property
from the rest of the parcel. See iL at 366.
190. See Spencer, supra note 2, at 168.
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by emphasizing different factors.
An example of the multi-factor test appears in United States v.
6625 Zumirez Drive,' which considered factors beyond simple
proportionality. 192 In this case, a California district court used a test
that evaluated: "(i) the inherent gravity of the offense compared
with the harshness of the penalty; (ii) whether the property was an
integral part of the commission of the crime; and (iii) whether the
criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in
terms of time and/or spatial use."193 The court explained that the
valuation of the gravity of the offense decreases depending on
whether the claimant was convicted, not charged with any crime, or
charged and acquitted. 4 6625 Zumirez Drive, decided shortly after
the Supreme Court declined to formulate an excessiveness test in
Austin, has been an influential guide for other courts that have
adopted similar multi-factor tests. 195
The balancing test in 6625 Zumirez Drive was superseded by the
Ninth Circuit's formulation of a two-prong analysis involving
instrumentality and proportionality-the second type of mixed test-
in United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Road. 96 Under this test, if a
court does not deem that the property has a "substantial connection"
to the offense, the property is not subject to forfeiture.1 97  Unlike
Justice Scalia's test in Austin, even if the government shows a
substantial relationship, the forfeiture is not necessarily
constitutional. The court must still undertake a proportionality
191. 845 F. Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. 1994), superseded by United States v. 6380 Little
Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995).
192. The District Court for the Central District of California based its opinion in part
on the Supreme Court's holding in Harmelin, see id. at 731, in which a majority of the
Court had called the proportionality principle into question and decided that it did not
apply to the Excessive Fines Clause. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only
extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime."); id. at 965 (opinion of
Scalia, J.) ("[No part of] the Eighth Amendment ... contain[s] a proportionality
guarantee.").
193. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. at 732.
194. See id. at 733.
195. See Spencer, supra note 2, at 177-78 (noting that although superseded in the Ninth
Circuit, the three-factor test used in 6625 Zumirez Drive has been adopted in various
other jurisdictions, including Georgia and Illinois).
196. 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit did not directly reject 6625 Zumirez
Drive, but rather considered the factors used in a variety of cases and determined that
"generally some form of the two-pronged approach ... has been followed." Id. at 982.
For a discussion of 6380 Little Canyon Road, see Nicgorski, supra note 2, at 398-99.
197. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d at 985.
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analysis in which it compares the defendant's culpability9 s with the
harshness of the penalty.'99  If the forfeiture is grossly
disproportionate, then it must be reduced.2 °0 The Ninth Circuit
adopted this two-prong approach because of the potential harsh
results of applying a strict instrumentality test.201
The third mixed test, which automatically allows for forfeiture if
the property is an instrumentality of the offense,2°2 was used even
prior to Austin in the Second Circuit case of United States v. 38
Whalers Cove Drive.2 3 Whereas the Ninth Circuit held in 6380 Little
Canyon Road that the property is not forfeitable unless it is an
instrumentality, the Second Circuit's test allows for more liberal
forfeiture of property.2" The 38 Whalers Cove Drive court held that
if the property is an instrumentality of the offense, then the forfeiture
is not considered punitive,205 and as such, forfeiture is automatic
because the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply 6 If the property
is not deemed an instrumentality of the offense, then the forfeiture is
presumptively "punitive" if it is "overwhelmingly disproportionate to
198. The court listed three factors to consider in determining culpability: (1) the
owner's negligence in allowing illegal use of property; (2) whether the owner was directly
involved in illegal activity and to what extent; and (3) the amount of the harm caused by
activity. See id. at 986.
199. The court considered three factors in determining the harshness of the forfeiture:
(1) the property's fair market value; (2) the "intangible, subjective value of the property";
and (3) the hardship to the defendant caused by the forfeiture. Id. at 985.
200. See id. at 986.
201. See id. at 983 ("We accept the proportionality test as a check on the
instrumentality approach."). The Ninth Circuit listed five reasons why a proportionality
component was appropriate: (1) because civil forfeitures also punish, they should
therefore be assessed the same as criminal forfeitures; (2) only through analysis of the
relationship between penalty and offense can excessiveness be found; (3) the Austin
Court's refused to endorse Justice Scalia's instrumentality test and endorsed other
relevant factors; (4) Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993), suggested that a
proportionality test is required; and (5) the government profits from the forfeiture, thus
necessitating closer scrutiny. See 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d at 983-84.
202. See supra note 156. (providing the Supreme Court's definition of
"instrumentality").
203. 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
204. The Second Circuit was the only circuit prior to Austin that applied the Excessive
Fines Clause to civil in rem forfeitures. See Andrew S. Williams, Note, Austin v. United
States: Illusory Protection Against In Rem Civil Forfeiture Actions?, 24 Sw. U. L. RnV.
251,261 (1994).
205. In its oral argument in Bajakajian, the government argued in the alternative a
slight variation on this theory. Instead of arguing that the Excessive Fines Clause does not
apply if instrumentality is found, the government argued that if instrumentality is found,
then there is proportionality. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Bajakajian (No. 96-1487),
available in 1997 WL 699804, at *6 (Nov. 4,1997).
206. See 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 36.
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the value of the offense." 2 7 In such a case the property is subject to
the Excessive Fines Clause.208 The government then has the burden
of showing that the full amount of the forfeiture serves legitimate
civil goals, such as reimbursing the cost of investigation or damages
resulting from the misconduct or removing the instrumentality of
crime from general circulation.2 9 To the extent that the forfeiture
does not serve a legitimate civil purpose, it is considered punitive and
is examined under a gross disproportionality standard.1
The various tests developed after Austin have all been applied to
civil in rem forfeiture. Even though Bajakajian involved a criminal in
personam forfeiture,211 the attorneys for both parties referred to the
excessiveness tests that had been applied in the circuit courts to civil
forfeiture.212 The Ninth Circuit in Bajakajian applied the 6380 Little
Canyon Road test to Bajakajian's forfeited currency and found that
the forfeiture failed the threshold examination for instrumentality. 213
Although it reached the same outcome as the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court rejected this methodology, explaining that the
"instrumentality" concept pertains only to civil in rem forfeitures,
which "historically have been treated as a form of 'guilty
property.' ",214 The fact that the Court drew this distinction suggests
that the excessiveness review for civil forfeiture should consider
instrumentality at least in part. In fact, within the Court's discussion
of civil forfeiture lies a suggested procedure for assessing a civil
forfeiture under the Excessive Fines Clause.215 The Bajakajian
Court's discussion of civil forfeiture, albeit in dictum, is perhaps the
most interesting aspect of the opinion because it may provide the
lower courts with clues-long awaited since Austin-as to how to
apply the Excessive Fines Clause to civil forfeiture.
Unlike criminal forfeiture, all of which is punitive in nature, civil
forfeiture may alternatively be justified as an instrumentality of the
offense or a remedy for the government's damages and enforcement
207. Id. at 35.
20& See id.
209. See id. at 37 (noting also that the government would be required to account for the
costs and damages with reasonable allocation for overhead costs).
210. See id. at 37-38.
211. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2034.
212. See Petitioner's Brief at 10-29, Bajakajian (No. 96-1487); Respondent's Brief at
10-21, Bajakajian (No. 96-1487).
213. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2032-33.
214. Id. at 2036.
215. See infra notes 244-62 and accompanying text.
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expenses.216  The Court in Bajakajian chose to ignore the Austin
Court's oversimplification that "forfeiture generally and [civil
forfeiture] in particular historically have been understood, at least in
part, as punishment. '217 In comparing early civil forfeiture to the
criminal forfeiture at issue in Bajakajian, the Court did not apply the
logical conclusion from the Austin Court's statement, under which all
civil forfeiture would automatically be subject to the Excessive Fines
Clause. Instead, the Court suggested that each civil forfeiture must
first be subject to an individual assessment of its punitive nature.218
Criminal forfeitures, however, are inherently punitive because they
are imposed only after conviction 19
The dissent in Bajakajian criticized the majority for suggesting
that "most in rem forfeitures (and perhaps most civil forfeitures) may
not be fines at all," 0 because this suggestion implies that most civil
forfeiture would not be subject to the Excessive Fines Clause."l The
dissent may have overread the majority opinion. In distinguishing
the criminal forfeiture at issue from historical civil forfeiture, the
majority's purpose was not to undercut the holding in Austin that
civil forfeiture may be subject to the Excessive Fines Clause, but
rather to distinguish a criminal forfeiture as per se punitive and
automatically subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.' 2 The majority
actually clarified its position in a footnote, acknowledging that a
modem statutory forfeiture under Austin may be a" 'fine' for Eighth
Amendment purposes if it constitutes punishment even in part,
regardless of whether the proceeding is styled in rem or in
personam."
The subtle, yet important, distinction from Austin is that the
majority in Bajakajian differentiated between modem civil in rem
forfeiture, which it admitted may be punitive, 24 and historical civil
216. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036,2039.
217. United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993); see supra notes 154-55 and
accompanying text (discussing the problems with the statement of the Austin Court).
218. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2035 n.6.
219. See id. at 2035 & n.6.
220. Id. at 2046 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy used "fine" to denote a
punitive nature. See id. at 2033 ("Forfeitures-payments in kind-are thus 'fines' if they
constitute punishment for an offense.").
221. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.
222- See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2035. The majority explained why an instrumentality
assessment is inappropriate for criminal in personam forfeitures. See id. at 2036.
223. Id. at 2035 n.6.
224. See id. ("[N]ot ... all modem civil in rem forfeitures are nonpunitive and thus
beyond the Excessive Fines Clause.").
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forfeitures, which "were ... not considered punishments."' This
position may reflect more accurately the actual justifications for these
historical forfeitures than did Justice Blackmun's attempt in Austin to
characterize all civil in rem forfeiture as at least partially punitive.226
The majority discussed the guilty property theory as an explanation
for early forfeitures,227 but it also argued that these early forfeitures
served remedial purposes as well.?
Among the three theories of justifying forfeiture-guilty
property theory, punitive theory (based either on the owner's own
criminal activity or negligent entrustment), and the remedial
theory-tension is again evident in Bajakajian. The danger in
justifying civil forfeiture using a remedial argument is that it leaves
open the possibility that lower courts will justify civil forfeiture as
remedial and thereby deny a constitutional "excessiveness" review,
since civil forfeiture is subject to the Excessive Fines Clause only if it
is found to be at least in part punitive. 9  Likewise, if the property
225. Id. at 2040 (citing Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871)). The
dissent charged the majority with "sweep[ing] all these precedents [of non-remedial
forfeitures] aside" and assuming that "the settled tradition was limited to 'reimbursing the
Government for' unpaid duties." Id. at 2042 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (quoting id. at 2040).
226. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
227. The majority in Bajakajian made appropriate reference to, but did not rely on, the
heritage of the guilty property theory for distinguishing civil and criminal forfeitures. See
Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2034. As recently as 1996, the Court in Bennis v. Michigan, 516
U.S. 442 (1996), conceded that this common law heritage is "'too firmly fixed in the
punitive and remedial jurisprudence of this country to be now displaced.'" Id. at 453
(quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)). The
question remains whether or not the modem Supreme Court will continue to justify civil
forfeitures in part under the "guilty property" theory. See Robert M. Sondak, Excessive
Currency Forfeiture Declared Unconstitutional, 12 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 1 (July
1998), available in WESTLAW, MONEYLLR Database.
228. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2040 (referring to the argument in Stockwell that the
forfeiture served to reimburse the government for losses due to evasion of customs
duties).
229. See id. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In Bajakajian, Justice Kennedy criticized
the majority for treating fines as "'remedial penalties' even though they far exceed the
harm suffered." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Cases such as One Lot Emerald Cut Stones
and Stockwell allowed the Bajakajian majority to characterize fines as serving a wholly
remedial purpose because the Court in those cases held fines to be remedial in nature even
when they were multiples of the value of the property. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones
v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 233 n.2 (1972) (per curiam); Stockwell v. United States, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 531,547 (1871).
At least one recent case since Bajakajian has determined that a civil forfeiture served
a "wholly remedial" purpose and therefore was not subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.
In re 1650 Cases of Seized Liquor, 721 A.2d 100, 108 (Vt. 1998). This case involved the
forfeiture of cases of liquor transported without a permit in violation of Vermont law. See
id. at 102. In characterizing the forfeiture as remedial, the Supreme Court of Vermont
relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Austin, recognizing "'that the forfeiture of
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can be identified as an instrumentality, then under the guilty property
theory these civil forfeitures also will not be subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause."3 This analysis suggests that only those forfeitures (or
portions of forfeitures) that cannot be justified under these two
theories will be considered punitive and subject to review for gross
disproportionality. 1
Without distinguishing between civil and criminal forfeiture, the
Bajakajian Court stated that "a punitive forfeiture violates the
Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of
a defendant's offense." 2  Given this rule, there seem to be two
possible ways of interpreting whether the holding applies to civil
forfeiture. First, under Austin, forfeitures are subject to the
Excessive Fines Clause if they are considered punitive or partly
punitive, and civil forfeiture specifically has been justified at least in
part as punishment. 3" Under this logic, the Bajakajian test would
apply to all forfeitures whether civil or criminal.? However, the
distinction between modem and historical civil forfeiture creates a
second possible interpretation. Contrary to Austin, the Court in
Bajakajian did not assert that all civil forfeitures are at least in part
punitive.35 Instead, it carefully described historical civil forfeitures
as either instrumentalities of the offense under the guilty property
theory or remedies for government losses and law enforcement
expenses. 6 Therefore, because civil forfeiture is inherently different
from criminal forfeiture both in purpose and procedure, a different
excessiveness test that considers the nature of the forfeiture should
contraband itself may be characterized as remedial because it removes dangerous or illegal
items from society.'" Id. at 108 (quoting United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 621
(1993)).
230. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036 n.8 ("A forfeiture which reaches beyond this
strict historical limitation [of instrumentality) is ipso facto punitive and therefore subject
to review under the Excessive Fines Clause." (first emphasis added)). This statement
suggests that forfeiture of property that can strictly be characterized as an instrumentality
is not subject to Excessive Fines Clause. See infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text for
further analysis of this point.
231. See infra note 257.
232 Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036.
233. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610, 618.
234. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 204, at 266 (arguing that because both civil and
criminal forfeitures punish property owners for their misconduct and because the
historical differences are of "no practical significance today," there is "no logical reason
why in personam criminal forfeitures and in rem civil forfeitures ... should be treated
differently for purposes of an Eighth Amendment proportionality test").
235. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
236. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2034-36.
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apply. 7
Several cases decided since Bajakajian have assumed that the
Bajakajian test does indeed apply to civil forfeiture, 23  perhaps
adopting the view that all forfeitures would be subject to the
excessiveness review. Other lower court decisions since the case have
assumed, however, that the holding does not apply to civil
forfeiture.19 While it is true that Bajakajian's holding may only be
binding on criminal forfeiture, the Court's dictum suggests that the
standard by which the Court will assess the "excessiveness" of a civil
forfeiture may depend on whether the forfeiture is characterized as
an instrumentality, remedy, or punishment. 40
The real difficulty in formulating a standard for applying the
Excessive Fines Clause to civil forfeiture is that over time the Court
has justified civil forfeiture under different theories. Therefore, it
has been difficult for the Court to explain all civil forfeitures under a
237. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 627-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
238. See United States v. 3814 NW Thurman St., 164 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding a civil forfeiture "excessive" under the Bajakajian test); United States v. 415 E.
Mitchell Ave., 149 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying the Bajakajian test without
reference to the civil/criminal distinction); United States v. $359,500 in U.S. Currency, 25
F. Supp. 2d 140, 147 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly
state that the Excessive Fines Clause analysis applies to civil forfeitures, this court rejects
the government's contention that Bajakajian only relates to punitive criminal forfeitures."
(citation omitted)).
415 East Mitchell Avenue involved a civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
(1994) for a drug violation. See 415 E. Mitchell Ave., 149 F.3d at 474. The claimant was
indicted and pled guilty in Ohio state court for drug abuse and trafficking in marijuana.
See id. at 475. The United States then brought a civil forfeiture action against his
residence, where the marijuana had been found. See id. Finding a "strong nexus" between
the property and the criminal activity, the magistrate judge granted the government's
summary judgment motion. Id On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered whether
"notwithstanding the existence of probable cause to support the forfeiture of claimant's
former residence, forfeiture would constitute an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth
Amendment." Id. at 476. The court of appeals cited Bajakajian for having articulated the
standard. See id. at 477 (citing Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2035-36). The court then
explained that the value of defendant's property ($220,000) should be compared to a
possible fine under federal law ($250,000), instead of the fine under state law ($8000),
because of the sophistication the drug operation. See id. Comparing the federal fine to
the property of the residence, the court held that there was no gross disproportionality and
therefore the forfeiture was not excessive. See id. at 478.
239. See, e.g., One (1) Charter Arms, Bulldog 44 Special v. State, 721 So. 2d 620, 623
n.3 (Miss. 1998) (noting that the Supreme Court has not yet prescribed a test for
determining the constitutionality of civil forfeitures and distinguishing Bajakajian as a
different type of forfeiture); In re 1650 Cases of Seized Liquor, 721 A.2d 100, 108 (Vt.
1998) (distinguishing Bajakajian as involving a criminal forfeiture and also holding that the
forfeiture was wholly remedial and therefore not subject to the Clause).
240. See infra notes 244-57 and accompanying text further analyzing this point.
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unified theory, as the Court attempted to do in Austin.41 In
discussing civil forfeiture, the Court at times has acknowledged the
guilty property root of civil forfeiture while at the same time
supplementing this justification by arguing that such forfeiture serves
either a remedial or punitive purpose.242 As a result, all three
justifications remain viable explanations for a particular forfeiture.2 43
Bajakajian suggests that civil forfeitures can be classified as
instrumentalities, remedies, or punishments.2 4 Property is forfeitable
as an instrumentality if it is "the actual means by which an offense
was committed."' 45 Property can also be forfeited, even if it is not an
instrumentality of the offense, if the forfeiture serves a remedial
purpose.2 46 In addition, recent statutory forfeitures may serve in part
or in whole to punish the defendant. 4 7 Therefore, depending on the
nature of the forfeiture, a different Excessive Fines Clause analysis
may be required.
If the forfeiture can be justified by the guilty property theory
alone, then instrumentality logically would be the appropriate
criterion for assessing constitutionality. The Bajakajian Court
defined instrumentality as "historically ... limited to the property
actually used to commit an offense and no more." 48 In a footnote to
the case, the Court noted that "[a] forfeiture that reaches beyond this
strict historical limitation [of instrumentality] is ipso facto punitive
and therefore subject to review under the Excessive Fines Clause."249
There are two ways to understand the implication of this statement as
to whether instrumentalities are subject to the Excessive Fines
241. See Austin, 509 U.S. 615-18; see also supra notes 152-55 (noting that in adopting a
unified theory for civil forfeitures, the Court in Austin was denying the earlier stated
justifications for the forfeitures).
242. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-86, 690
(1974); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (per
curiam); Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 551 (1871).
243. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2035 n.6.
244. See id at 2035 n.8 (discussing civil forfeitures as "instrumentality" forfeitures); id.
at 2040 (explaining that early monetary forfeitures served a remedial purpose); id. at 2035
n.6 (acknowledging that some modem forfeitures may constitute punishment).
245. Id. at 2036 n.8 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 627-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
508-10 (1921)); see also supra note 156 (defining "instrumentality" in previous cases).
246. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2039-40 (explaining that early monetary forfeitures
and forfeitures of goods to vindicate the government's underlying property rights were
justified because of their remedial purpose).
247. See id. at 2035 n.6.
248. Id. at 2036 n.8 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 627-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)).
249. Id. at 2036 n.8.
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Clause. The language does not necessarily indicate that an
instrumentality justification of the forfeiture precludes an
excessiveness review. Such an understanding may be inferred,
however, because the Court did not reject the government's
contention that a forfeiture "is constitutional because it involves an
'instrumentality' of [the] respondent's crime."5 0 Instead, the Court
indicated the inapplicability of this concept in the criminal forfeiture
context, noting that in a criminal in personam proceeding, "[i]t is ...
irrelevant whether respondent's currency is an instrumentality."'
Notably, the Court did not indicate that the concept that
instrumentality precludes "excessiveness" was wrong as applied to
civil forfeiture, even though the government was arguing by analogy
to civil forfeiture cases.~2 From this absence of further clarification,
one may infer that the Court accepted a preliminary instrumentality
determination as it applies to civil forfeiture.
Alternatively, the Court's failure to clarify or reject the
government's position can be explained because further clarification
would have been superfluous to consideration of the criminal
forfeiture at issue. Despite the fact that such declarations were
irrelevant to its decision, however, the Court did clarify what
constitutes an instrumentality and stated that Bajakajian's currency
would not have been an instrumentality of the crime of non-
reporting2 3 This dictum suggests that had the Court disagreed with
the government's instrumentality threshold test for civil forfeiture, it
would have said so. One might conclude, then, that if a forfeiture is
narrowly construed as an instrumentality of the offense, it
automatically survives the Excessive Fines Clause.
Regarding other, non-instrumentality justifications of
forfeitures, proportionality exists if the forfeiture can be justified as
serving a remedial purpose,254 which may include repaying the
government for its expenses and losses or removing contraband or
the fruits of the illegal activity.25- As in 38 Whalers Cove, the
250. Id. at 2036.
251. Id.
252. See Petitioner's Brief at 17-18, Bajakajian (No. 96-1487).
253. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036 nn.8-9.
254. See id. at 2040. The Court contrasted early currency forfeiture statutes that
imposed remedial sanctions with the forfeiture in question, which served no remedial
purpose. See id. at 2041. The Court explained that these early statutes "in no way suggest
that ... [the] currency forfeiture [of the statute at issue] is constitutionally proportional."
Id. This comment implies that if a forfeiture is remedial, then it is proportional.
255. See United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993) ("[W]e have recognized that
forfeiture of contraband itself may be characterized as remedial because it removes
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government should have the burden of showing that the forfeiture
reimburses the government for costs of investigating and damages
resulting from the misconduct at issue. 6 To the extent that the
forfeiture exceeds an amount allocable to the reimbursement of
government expenses and damages or the value of the contraband,
that portion of the forfeiture constitutes punishment and should be
examined under Bajakajian's gross disproportionality review!57
In Bajakajian, the Court did not say whether only that portion of
a forfeiture that cannot be justified as instrumentality or remedy is
subject to examination for gross disproportionality. Such a
conclusion, however, seems logical. As opposed to subjecting the
entire forfeiture amount or property to a proportionality review, this
method would compare only the amount that serves to punish with
the suggested punishment itself.
The following hypothetical illustrates how this suggested
excessiveness review of civil forfeiture would function. Suppose a
tract of real property is subject to forfeiture because large drug
quantities have been stored in a barn on the edge of the property.
The barn would be subject to automatic forfeiture because it is a
means by which the offense was committed.58  An amount of the
property would also be forfeitable to the extent that additional
property is needed to compensate the government for law
enforcement expenses that can reasonably be attributed to the
criminal activity. 9  Any further forfeiture of the property would
dangerous or illegal items from society." (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984))). As a continuation of this logic, the proceeds of
contraband are also subject to remedial civil forfeiture. See Leiske, supra note 2, at 294-
95; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Bajakajian (No. 96-1487), available in 1997 WL
699804, at *39 (Nov. 4, 1997) ("[Cjontraband and proceeds of contraband have always
been a strong remedial interest, and have been forfeited.").
256. See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1991). The
dissent in Bajakajian criticized the majority for treating fines as "'remedial' penalties even
though they far exceed[ed] the harm suffered." Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2041 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). These forfeitures may have been justified largely under an instrumentality
theory, however, in which case the value of the property may bear no relation to the
amount that the government suffered as a result of the offense.
257. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2038-39 (explaining the gross disproportionality
review); see also supra notes 52, 56-58 and accompanying text (same); cf. Cole, supra note
2, at 261 (noting that proceeds from drug sales are forfeitable and "if the state has not
forfeited a defendant's drug proceeds (because of consumption or tracing problems), the
cost theory would support forfeiting facilitation property up to the value of the
unavailable proceeds").
258. Cf supra note 245 and accompanying text (explaining instrumentality as a
justification for civil forfeiture).
259. Cf. supra note 246 and accompanying text (explaining that civil forfeiture may be
justified as having a remedial purpose).
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serve a strictly punitive purpose.20 This property would only be
forfeitable if its total amount is not grossly disproportionate to the
gravity of the offense, as measured by considering the owner's
culpability and the harm caused.261
This suggested excessiveness review for civil forfeiture exempts
forfeiture of instrumentalities from a proportionality review and
acknowledges the proportionality of remedial forfeitures. It
recognizes the historical roots of civil forfeiture while at the same
time maintaining logical consistency in applying the same Excessive
Fines Clause review for both criminal and civil forfeiture that serve a
punitive purpose. As in 38 Whalers Cove Drive, this method enables
an excessiveness review of civil forfeiture but exposes to a
proportionality review only that part of a forfeiture that cannot be
explained as an instrumentality or remedy.6 2
One criticism of applying a similar excessiveness review to
punitive civil forfeiture and criminal forfeiture is that procedurally,
civil forfeiture is not handled in the same manner as criminal
forfeiture 263  and therefore may in fact require a stricter
constitutionality review than is provided by the gross
disproportionality test.264  The question remains whether a
proportionality review can in some way compensate for the lack of
procedural protection in civil forfeiture. Although the Bajakajian
Court seems to have imposed the gross disproportionality standard
on all punitive forfeitures,265 it did not dictate what factors may be
260. Cf. supra note 247 and accompanying text (explaining that civil forfeiture may be
punitive in whole or in part).
261. This result would be consistent with Justice Scalia's argument for narrowly
defining instumentality in Austin. Cf Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the relevant
inquiry for an excessive forfeiture should be "the relationship of the property to the
offense"); supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text (discussing Scalia's concurrence).
Had this theory been applied in United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452 (7th Cir. 1995), for
example, it is likely that only Plescia's telephone-and not his entire house-would have
been subject to forfeiture. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Plescia, see supra
notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text (discussing the test applied in 38
Whalers Cove Drive).
263. See Williams, supra note 204, at 267 (noting that because the property owner is
procedurally disadvantaged in in rem proceedings, as opposed to in personam criminal
proceedings, additional factors should be considered); see also supra notes 3 & 10
(discussing the procedural differences).
264. See also supra note 2 (discussing the popularity of civil forfeitures for
circumventing the procedural protections of a criminal proceeding); supra notes 3 & 10
(discussing the procedural differences between civil and criminal forfeitures).
265. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036.
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considered in a particular proportionality review. 6625 Zumirez
Drive offers a mitigating solution of valuing the gravity of the offense
according to whether the claimant was convicted, not charged with a
crime, or acquitted.266 This consideration would enable the Court to
maintain its continued assertion that innocent owners may be subject
to civil forfeiture, yet it would provide a mechanism for considering
the proven culpability of the owner when balancing the harshness of
the forfeiture against the gravity of the offense.267 In the case of an
innocent owner, then, a forfeiture would be considered excessive to
the extent that it is punitive.
Under the review suggested in Bajakajian, the degree to which
the Excessive Fines Clause will actually impose constitutional
limitations on civil forfeitures will depend largely on how narrowly a
court defines instrumentality or remedy. It will also depend on how
deferential a court is to Congress's judgment on the appropriate
punishment. Fortunately, Bajakajian provides guidelines both for
defining instrumentality and remedies and for undertaking the
proportionality review. The majority defined instrumentality and
provided an example of how to apply the definition in its assessment
of Bajakajian's currency.216 The Court also stated that a remedial
forfeiture should be limited to that which would compensate the
government for investigative and enforcement expenses.269
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy primarily criticized the majority
for failing to give sufficient deference to Congress's determination of
an appropriate penalty.27 There is an inherent difficulty, however, in
affording deference to legislative discretion when assessing the
constitutional excessiveness of a chosen penalty.271 While the dissent
266. See United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725,733 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
267. One commentator has rejected the proportionality review for civil forfeitures
because the court would have to weigh the severity of the offense even though the
government would not need to prove the owner's guilt. See Munn, supra note 2, at 1275.
Consideration of the three culpability categories avoids this problem and protects the
defendant from self-incrimination conflicts. See id.
268. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036 n.8 ("[Instrumentality] fairly characterizes
property that historically was subject to forfeiture because it was the actual means by
which an offense was committed.").
269. See id. at 2040.
270. See id. at 2044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This criticism was also raised in Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). See supra note 168.
271. One commentator has questioned whether the Solem test protects against an
"overzealous legislature." He notes that other commentators have argued that the
"'Eighth Amendment exists precisely because Congress may one day intend to impose an
excessive fine.'" Spencer, supra note 2, at 174 (quoting Sarah N. Welling & Meredith Lee
Hager, Defining Excessiveness: Applying the Eighth Amendment in Civil Forfeiture After
Austin v. United States, 83 KY. L.J. 835, 836 (1994-1995)).
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correctly noted that Congress chose to punish the offense of non-
reporting with not only fines and imprisonment but also forfeiture,272
the forfeiture may not necessarily be proportional to Congress's
actual valuation of the gravity of the offense. The amount of the
forfeiture can vary greatly depending on the value of the property
involved.273 For example, during the government's oral argument,
one of the Justices asked whether the Taj Mahal would be forfeited if
marijuana had been sold inside.274 The Justice wondered whether the
point was correct that, "without limitation, no matter how valuable
the property, it is forfeitable if used to commit a crime?" 275 Another
problem with not considering the value of the property in a
proportionality test is that assets of the poor are more likely forfeited
than those of the wealthy.276 Because the value of property owned by
the poor is likely to be lower, there is a greater chance that forfeiture
would not be grossly disproportionate to the crime.
As in proportionality assessments under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, a court has a role to play in considering factors
specific to the individual perpetrator and the offense.277 Therefore, it
was appropriate for the majority to consider the fact that Bajakajian
lawfully possessed and transported his money. The majority used the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a proxy for legislative intent in
valuing the gravity of the offense and for assessing gross
disproportionality.278 The dissent challenged the majority's use of the
272 See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
273. Cf. Cole, supra note 2, at 266 ("The role of chance in determining the scope of a
forfeiture does pose difficult challenges in articulating a palatable theory of forfeiture
law.").
274. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Bajakajian (No. 96-1487), available in 1997 WL
699804, at *13 (Nov. 4, 1997).
275. Id. Counsel responded that while a single transaction may not warrant forfeiture,
"at some point yes, if you're running a business out of the Taj Mahal and selling drugs out
of there, that would be an instrumentality and could be forfeited as such." Id. at "14.
276. See Nicgorski, supra note 2, at 406 (citing Daniel P. Buckley, Note, A Proposed
Measure for Excessiveness After Austin v. United States Put a Twist on the Forfeiture
Laws, 29 GONZ. L. REv. 621, 633-35 (1994)). One way to avoid the problem of comparing
the value of the property and the gravity of the offense is to consider value not just in
terms of market price, but in terms of the importance of the property to the owner. See
Spencer, supra note 2, at 185-86 (noting, for example, that one person's "luxury car is
another['s] sole means of transportation and the product of years of savings").
277. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 (noting that in assessing the gravity of the offense,
"[c]omparisons can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society, and the culpability of the offender").
278. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2038 & n.14 (citing GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 61, § 5E1.2(d); id. at 2039 (noting that full forfeiture is larger than the amount
determined under the Guidelines "by many orders of magnitude").
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, seven factors exist for determining the
[Vol. 771630
CIVIL FORFEITURE
Guidelines over Congress's judgment of the appropriate penalty,
which included full forfeiture. 9 It is difficult to imagine, however,
how a fine or forfeiture would ever be considered excessive if a court
followed the dissent's suggestion to accord full deference to
Congress's judgments on penalties. If Congress decides to spell out
the penalty for an offense, and such penalty is automatically viewed
as proportional because Congress selected it, then any protection
provided by the Excessive Fines Clause could be legislated out of
existence.
Additionally, the dissent criticized the use of the Guidelines
because the "purpose of the Guidelines ... is to select punishments
with precise proportion, not to opine on what is a gross
disproportion." 0  Reflected in this criticism is a continuing
disagreement over the extent to which a proportionality review
should consider individualized factors. While it is true that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines serve to create proportional
punishments across districts and thus apply more individualized
factors than were mentioned in Solem, the majority used the
recommended fine only to assess the gravity of the offense and then
separately considered whether gross disproportionality existed. 8 ' By
considering factors specific to the individual defendant when
comparing the gravity of the offense to the harshness of the penalty
under a gross disproportionality standard, the Court struck a balance
between individual review and broad policy-based judgments on
appropriate penalties. In so doing, the majority evaded the inherent
amount of a fine:
(1) the need for the combined sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense
(including the harm or loss to the victim and the gain to the defendant), to
promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment and to afford
adequate deterrence;
(2) any evidence presented as to defendant's ability to pay the fine...;
(3) the burden that the fine places on the defendant and his dependents relative
to alternative punishments;
(4) any restitution or reparation that the defendant has made or is obligated to
make;
(5) any collateral consequences of conviction...;
(6) whether the defendant previously has been fined for a similar offense; and
(7) any other pertinent equitable considerations.
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 61, § 5E1.2(d); see also Poe, supra note 60, at 257-63
(providing a detailed discussion of the use of Sentencing Guidelines in a proportionality
analysis); Williams, supra note 204, at 270 n.147 (advocating the use of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines as a guide to determining what equitable factors are important for
consideration).
279. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
280. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
281. See id. at 2038-39.
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difficulty in affording deference to legislative judgment while
protecting against overly zealous punishments.
It is somewhat ironic that in striking down a criminal forfeiture
as "excessive" under the Excessive Fines Clause for the first time, the
Bajakajian Court also may have resolved a lingering debate over the
scope of civil forfeiture in favor of a more liberal approach to
forfeiture. Before Bajakajian, the argument remained viable that
civil forfeiture might serve only the limited purpose of removing the
instrumentality of the offense or remedying the government's losses.
In such a case, any civil forfeiture imposed for punitive purposes
would be found excessive to the extent it exceeded these other
purposes.' But the Court's statement in footnote eight that "[a]
forfeiture that reaches beyond this strict historical limitation is ipso
facto punitive and therefore subject to review under the Excessive
Fines Clause"'  suggests that property beyond that which narrowly
qualifies as an instrumentality may be forfeited under a civil
proceeding, even if it serves a solely punitive purpose. In accepting
this expanded use of civil forfeiture, the Court necessarily rejected
the views of Justice Scalia and the Ninth Circuit that only
instrumentalities of the offense may survive an excessiveness review
and be subject to civil forfeiture.'
In footnote eight the majority appears to take the position that
property which is not wholly justified as an instrumentality may be
forfeited, but is subject to review under the gross disproportionality
standard. 5 In effect, this holding would allow the government to use
a civil proceeding even when the sole purpose is to impose
punishment. Instead of reining in the government's use of civil
forfeiture in avoidance of criminal procedural requirements, the
Court is acknowledging this use and prohibiting it only when the
forfeiture is "grossly" disproportionate to the punishment that would
have been imposed had the owner been found guilty in a criminal
proceeding.
282- See United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) ("[A]n in rem forfeiture goes beyond the traditional
limits that the Eighth Amendment permits if it applies to property that cannot properly be
regarded as an instrumentality of the offense ....").
283. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036 n.8.
284. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 627-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (arguing that the Excessive Fines Clause should not apply to civil forfeitures
unless the property is an instrumentality of the offense); United States v. Bajakajian, 84
F.3d 334, 336 (9th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (explaining that in order to be
constitutionally valid, a forfeiture must be an instrumentality of the offense).
285. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036 n.8.
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Under this reading of Bajakajian, the Court has seemingly
lowered the constitutional bar for civil forfeiture, thus significantly
facilitating the government's job in seeking such a penalty. Whether
courts will recognize this expansion of civil forfeiture would appear
to depend on their interpretation of footnote eight. After Bajakajian,
however, it is certainly possible that Justice Thomas-likely
unintentionally-has added to the prosecutorial advantages
previously afforded to civil forfeiture,"6 perhaps even making
criminal forfeiture virtually obsolete in jurisdictions where both
options are available. Yet despite this apparent expansion of civil
forfeiture, the Bajakajian Court did hold a statutorily-imposed
forfeiture to be unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause.
This decision reflects the Court's growing concern toward the
expansive use of forfeiture in general.- Therefore, it will be
interesting to see whether, when faced with a case addressing the
constitutional excessiveness of a civil forfeiture, Justice Thomas will
recognize-and close-the door that he opened in Baakaian."s8
CHARMIN BORTZ SHIELY
286. See supra notes 3 & 10 (explaining the advantages that the government enjoys in
seeking civil forfeiture rather than criminal forfeiture).
287. The dissent's criticism of Justice Thomas's opinion in Bajakajian also indicates the
controversial nature of reevaluating deference to legislative choice. See supra notes 270-
79 and accompanying text (discussing the controversy regarding judicial deference to
legislative judgment).
288. Commentators on the decision in Bajakajian have been fascinated by the fact that
Justice Thomas authored the opinion and was joined by the more liberal Justices on the
Court. See, e.g., James Kilpatrick, Court Decides What's 'Excessive,' STATE J.-REG.
(Springfield, Ill.), July 7, 1998, at 4 (noting that the decision was a "historic moment" in
that Justice Thomas had never before "found himself in a jurisprudential bed with Justices
Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg"); Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Court Cracks Down on
Property Seizures, NAT'LJ., June 27, 1998, at 1490 (opining that Bajakajian reflects Justice
Thomas's "libertarian bent"); Frank J. Murray, Scalia, Thomas Part Ways on Excessive
Fine Decision: Like-Minded Justices Disagree on Customs' Action Toward Traveler,
WASH. TIMEs, June 23, 1998, at A3 ("The decision ... marked the first time Justice
Antonin Scalia voted against one of the 61 majority opinions Justice Thomas has written
since joining the high court in October 1991."). This split is not entirely surprising,
however. In the 1993 case of United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S.
43 (1993), involving due process requirements for civil property forfeiture, Justice Thomas
concurred with the majority's "expressed distrust of the Government's aggressive use of
broad civil forfeiture statutes." Id at 82. He further noted that "it may be necessary-in
an appropriate case-to reevaluate [the Court's] generally deferential approach to
legislative judgments in this area of civil forfeiture." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Sondak, supra note 227, at 1 (discussing Justice Thomas's
history of expressing concern for the government's unbridled use of civil forfeiture
powers).
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